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I. INrRODUCTION
Public confidence in the judicial system is critical to a free society. The
court is a manifestation of society's conscience, compassion and wisdom and
when judges speak, they are society's voice. Hawai'i's Code of Judicial
Conduct ("Code") prohibits certain conduct merely because that conduct
"appears" wrong.' Nothing more is needed than that. It requires a judge to
curtail personal activities based on appearances alone because it recognizes
that public confidence in the judiciary must be placed above all else.2 It is
only confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court that allows the
public and litigants to say, "I don't agree with the decision, but I accept it as
fairly and honestly rendered and will abide by it."3
The justices of the Hawai'i Supreme Court appoint the trustees under the
will of Bernice Pauahi Bishop,4 which empowered the justices of the supreme
court to select trustees5 to the charitable trust established under the will. The
* Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law. This Article originally
appeared in the Hawaii Bar Journal, February 1998. The Article has been edited and updated
from the original.
See HAW. REV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2A (1992).
2 Professor Abramson notes:
For generations... it has been taught that a judge must possess the confidence of the
community; that [the judge] must not only be independent and honest, but equally
important, believed by all ... to be independent and honest .... "[J]ustice must not only
be done, it must be seen as done." Without the appearance as well as the fact of justice,
respect for the law vanishes in a democracy.
Leslie Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 949, 962-63
(1996)(alterations in original except for first ellipsis)(quoting In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727,
753 (Mich. 1977)).
1 See Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: More
Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, I CONST. COMM. 57 (1984)(describing the power of the
office).
4 Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop died on October 16, 1884. Her will was executed on
October 31, 1883, with codicils executed on October 4, 1884. The will established a perpetual
charitable trust with income used for establishing and maintaining an educational facility
described elsewhere in her will.
I The Will provides:
I further direct that the number of my said trustees shall be kept at five; and that vacancies
shall be filled by the choice of a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the
selection made from persons of the Protestant religion.
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court has ruled that the justices act in their individual capacity in selecting
trustees.6 This decision is itself controversial. The power to appoint is a
perquisite of office, which power the justices receive upon their appointment
to the court and are divested from upon their departure.7 In the eyes of the
public, it is one of the trappings of their judicial position.' Kamehameha
Will of Bernice Pauahi Bishop, art. 14 [hereinafter Will], reprinted in Appendix B to this issue
of the University of Hawai'i Law Review. See Kekoa v. Supreme Court, 55 Haw. 104,516 P.2d
1239 (1973)(holding that appointment is not state action). The will of William Charles Lunalilo
also vested such authority in the justices by will dated January 31, 1874. See Will of William
Charles Lunalilo, sec. 3. Since that time, the justices have apparently declined other requests
to nominate trustees under a will. See Samuel King, Msgr. Charles Kekumano, Walter Heen,
Gladys Brandt & Randall Roth, Broken Trust, HONOLULU STAR-BU.ErIN, Aug. 9,1997, at B- I
[hereinafter Broken Trust], reprinted in Appendix C to this issue of the University of Hawai'i
Law Review.
See King v. Smith, 250 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1918); Kekoa, 55 Haw. 104, 516 P.2d 1239.
"[The Hawaii Supreme Court Justices select the trustees specifically because of their
status as Supreme Court Justices, and not as named individuals or because of anything they have
accomplished or attained as individuals outside the court." Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate andthe Constitution, 17 U.HAW.LREV. 413,421(1995).
The potential for both personal and governmental liability for negligent appointments is
certainly conceivable. Personal liability for negligent selection seems possible under a negligent
hiring theory. See Janssen v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 731 P.2d 163
(1987)(holding that negligent hiring depends on foreseeability). As to governmental liability,
the court has held that an employer can be liable for negligent conduct of an employee if "the
employee's conduct was related to the employment enterprise or if the enterprise derived any
benefit from the activity." Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, Inc., 76 Haw. 433,441,
879 P.2d 538,546(1994). The power to appoint is an incident of their employment as justices,
a point reinforced by the fact that the selection committee considered how judicial candidates
would exercise their power to appoint Bishop Estate trustees if selected. Although they
purportedly serve as individuals and the justices are free not to participate, their philosophy on
selection was apparently a regularly explored topic during the justice selection process. "Hare
[Michael Hare, a member of the Judicial Selection Committee] said he recalled asking similar
questions of potential candidates... His questioning, he said, was along the lines of criteria
and process for picking trustees." Bishop Estate Critics Press for Answers, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Aug. 17, 1997, at B3. Moreover, the cloak of absolutejudicial immunity cannot
shield the government because it applies only for their judicial actions. See Seibel v. Kemble,
63 Haw. 516,521,631 P.2d 173 (1981).
' See King, 250 F. 145 (affirming In re Estate of Bishop, 23 Haw. 575 (1917) and holding
that the terms of the will called for appointment by the justices individually). When the will was
made, granting to the holder of a certain judicial position the power to appoint was not an
entirely unusual term in a will. See Moore v. Isbel, 40 Iowa 383,388 (1875)("[A]cting county
judge ... conferred the power of appointment upon the individual who filled the office of
county judge at the time the appointment should be demanded"); National Webster Bank v.
Eldridge, 115 Mass. 424, 427 (1874)(providing that in default of appointment by trustees, the
vacancy was to be filled by "the judge of probate or by any justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court"); Shaw v. Paine, 12 Allen (Mass.) 293 (1866)(specifying that trustee was to be
"appointed by said judge of probate, or by one or more of the justices of the supreme judicial
court"). When the several justices of the Hawai'i Supreme Court were divested of original
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Schools Bishop Estate ("Bishop Estate" or the "Estate") is an important
charitable institution with significant wealth, land and influence in Hawai'i;
its activities impact the lives of all citizens of Hawai'i.
The Bishop Estate regularly appears before the courts of Hawai'i, including
the supreme court. From time to time, but not always, the justices have
recused themselves from hearing some Bishop Estate matters.' Moreover, the
supreme court reviews the actions of the probate court, which in turn hears
matters related to charitable trusts.' ° Finally, the state's attorney general, who
must oversee, regulate, and prosecute the conduct of trustees appointed by the
jurisdiction in probate and equity by the Judiciary Act of 1892, their power of appointment
might have been transferred to the appropriate court with jurisdiction over trust appointments
rather than finding the will granted the power to the individuals. See In re Estate of Bishop, 11
Haw. 33 (1897)(deciding that although will directs accounting to the "Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or other highest judicial officer in this country," the Master's report should be
filed with the probate court); see also In re Lovejoy, 227 N.E.2d 497,500 (Mass. 1967)(holding
that trustee to be appointed by the "appropriate court" was governed by statute and not within
the discretionary power of the court); Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457
(1938)(ruling that power to appoint guardian vested in probate court and not individually in the
judge).
Several authors have questioned the role of the justices as state actors because of the Bishop
Estate's racial and religious preferences in admission and hiring. See Leigh Caroline Case,
Note, Hawaiian Eth(n)ics: Race and Religion in Kamehameha Schools, 1 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 131 (1992); Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 420 (noting that at time of publication, justices
had not made clear that they will consider non-Protestants as trustees). The teacher hiring
preferences were struck down in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kamehameha
Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
" Recusal is a problem, not a solution. If important matters arising out of the current
controversy are appealed, HawaiTs citizens will either see a supreme court tainted by a
relationship to the Bishop Estate or one wholly sitting by designation, and thereby be deprived
of the judicial wisdom of its highest judicial officers. One observer criticized the Hawai'i
Supreme Court justices' decision to appoint trustees, noting:
The fact that an entire court felt compelled to disqualify (in Kekoa v. Supreme Court, 55
Haw. 104, 516 P.2d 1239 (1973)) itself may indicate that an appointment power was
exercised that should have been declined. A judiciary generally should not accept
additional duties that may result in recusation unless the duties are of such a nature that
judicial performance is required and alternatives do not suffice.
Michael P. Cox, Application of "Sunset Principles" to State Judicial Functions: The Power to
Appoint, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 204, 299-303 (1980).
'0 The dual roles are plagued by conflict. In the justices' response to the "Broken Trust"
article, they stated that one reason they abandoned the blue ribbon committee's list was
"[b]ecause we were not assured that the panel reached out to all potential applicants, regardless
of race, religion or political persuasion." Ronald T.Y. Moon et al., Justices Reject 'Broken
Trust' Criticisms, HONOLULU STAR-BUIErIN, Aug. 21, 1997, at A-19. When the justices
abandoned the religious criteria for trustees set in the will were they required to seek permission
of the probate court? The Commission on Judicial Conduct had issued a ruling that the justices
could not participate in discriminatory practices. See Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal
Advisory Opinion #14-93, Apr. 7, 1994.
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justices, must also appear before those justices in matters concerning the state
and its people. Thejustices should stop appointing the trustees of the Bishop
Estate because exercising the appointment power bestowed by the will raises
an appearance of impropriety, bias and conflict under the Code and has the
potential to undermine the confidence of the public in our judicial system.
CANON 2: A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities
A judge must "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of the judge's activities" and act at all times in a manner that "promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'" Yet, publicity,
controversy and criticism 3 have long followed the justices as they fulfill their
appointment duties to Bishop Estate. 4 Criticism is not new; citizens twice
have tried to block the current justices' predecessors from appointing
trustees.'
5
" As one commentator noted:
The Bishop Estate is fully entangled with the state .... The legislative, executive, and
judicial branches regulate the trust: the legislature sets the salaries of the trustees, the
Governor appoints the Supreme Court Justices, the Attorney General is parens patriae of
the trust, and the judiciary nominates and confirms the trustees."
Case, supra note 8, at 135 (citations omitted).
12 HAW. REV. CODE OF JUDICIALCONDUCr Canon 2A (1992).
13 Case, supra note 8, at 135, concludes that the justices' participation in the selection
process constitutes state action, in part because the factors they would consider in appointing
trustees are considered when the candidates for justice are considered. "The imprimatur of the
state is found not only in this obligation of the State Attorney General to enforce the
appointment of the trustees, but also in the action of the Governor and State Senate in nomi-
nating and confirming the Supreme Court justices." Id. Retired Judge Walter Heen alleges that
when he was interviewed as an applicant forjustice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, he was asked
what kind of person he would select for Bishop Estate trustee. See Broken Trust, supra note 4.
"4 See Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 418, nn. 21-26 (describing public criticism during
appointment process of Gerard Jervis); see also, e.g., Dan Boylan, Courting Disaster in Bishop
Business, MIDWEEK, Sept. 10, 1997, at A-9 ("Indeed the honorable court's choices over the last
quarter-century have been so singularly political in appearance that in the public's mind they've
turned the Bishop Estate into the ultimate 'high three' retirement of Hawaii politics."); John
Flanagan, Break the Circle of Patronage, HoNOLUU STAR-BtauzrLN, Aug. 23, 1997, at B-1;
Desmond Byrne, High Court Must Stop Picking Bishop Trustees, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug.
22, 1997, at A12; A.A. Smyser, 'Broken Trust' Report Was Sorely Needed, HONOLUW STAR-
BuuEIN, Aug. 14, 1997, at A-24 (describing the "collusive cob web linking the estate trustees,
the justices of the state Supreme Court, and the Judicial Selection Commission and former Gov.
John Waihee."); Robert R. Midkiff, Bishop Estate Has Outgrown Its Status as a Trust,
HONOLULU STAR-BuLLETIN, Aug. 22, 1997, at A-19 ("[Tihe appointment of individual trustees
by the Hawaii Supreme Court is no longer appropriate.").
"S Both challenges were the result of an outcry over a nominee. See, e.g., Kekoa v. Supreme
Court, 55 Haw. 104, 516 P.2d 1239 (1973)(regarding objection to Matsuo Takabuki; a court
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Speculation concerning political influence demeans the image of the court
and its justices and cheats well-qualified trustees of public respect they may
otherwise deserve.' In 1993-1994, the justices unsuccessfully attempted to
cure the appearance of conflict and political influence from their selection
process 7 by appointing a "blue ribbon" panel to screen applicants. 8 In the
sitting by designation following recusal of justices rules that the justices' action is not state
action because they serve in their individual capacity); King v. Smith, 250 F. 145 (9th Cir.
1918)(regarding objection to William Williamson; justices select trustees in their individual
capacity and are not disqualified from reviewing cases).
Of import, in King, the court explained that the justices "get nothing, can expect nothing,.
•. and derive no benefit from the act whatsoever." id. at 150. However, in 1994, when the
justices appointed Gerard Jervis, they appointed a person who had served on the selection
committee that had appointed several of them to the Supreme Court. See Broken Trust, supra
note 3. Moreover, Bishop Estate trusteeship has long been criticized as a "political plum"
awarded to loyal friends of the state's most powerful. Thus, the appointment of politicians,
confidantes of politicians and, in one case, a former supreme court justice, suggests that an
unquantifiable amount of influence is bestowed on one who can appoint another to a post
boasting a yearly paycheck just under a million dollars.
6 In light of Bishop Estate's influence in the state, Canon 5's admonition against
"engag[ing] in political activity" is also applicable. See Commission on Judicial Conduct,
Formal Advisory Opinion #14-93, Apr. 7, 1994. The appointment of trustees with interests
aligned with the political power of the current government broadens the power of both the
Bishop Estate and the incumbent political party. See Case, supra note 8.
Such suspicions, however unfounded, will be inevitable as long as the Hawaii Supreme
Court continues to select the trustees. It would be fairer both to the trustees and to the
justices if a different process were used, and ultimately the Hawaiian beneficiaries should
play a central role in this process.
Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 425.
" The appointment of retiring supreme court justice William S. Richardson by his
colleagues certainly raises questions as well. After all, he had shared the power of appointment
with his fellow justices for years. They necessarily struggled, debated, compromised and
negotiated to reach consensus and act as one court as they administered justice. Now, in their
private capacity, they elevated one of their peers to a position of wealth and power. It raises,
at best, "an appearance of impropriety." While Justice Richardson's career and service to
Hawai'i made him well-qualified to serve the trust, his affiliation to the body that appointed him
overshadowed his qualifications.
Is The 1993-94 selection process was described as follows:
In 1993-94, the Hawaii Supreme Court Justices went through an elaborate process to
pick a new trustee, and received widespread criticism for their actions. The Court first
appointed an 11-member panel of citizens who nominated five candidates. Then the
Justices received a ruling from the Commission on Judicial Conduct stating that it does
not violate the law or judicial ethics for them to select the Bishop Estate Trustees.
After the Justices received this qualified green light, they reopened the process, but this
time without the help of the blue-ribbon citizens panel.. . and added ten new names to
the list of candidates to make a list of 15.
Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 418 (footnotes omitted).
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end, the justices did not select an appointee from the list generated by their
blue ribbon panel. Instead, they selected a person who was both a friend of
Governor John Waihee and had served and chaired the Judicial Selection
Commission during the time several of them were appointed to the bench by
Governor Waihee.
In response to recent criticism concerning their role in the last trustee
appointment, the justices recently publicly explained why they disregarded the
panel's recommendations and assured the public that their decision was not
politically motivated. 9 However, it is nevertheless inescapable that the
interwoven relationships of key people in the appointment process raise
questions as to the motives that might lie behind various appointments, first
of the justices to the bench and then of the individuals to the Estate.'
Regardless of either the justices' or the trustees' qualifications, the process
employed in 1994 raised questions as to whether either judicial nominees or
trust appointees were appointed based on political connections rather than
merit.
The appointment of an unpopular appointee also reflects on the justices'
judgment and integrity in the eyes of the appointee's detractors, and thus
unnecessarily draws the justices into a controversy unrelated to their judicial
office.2 The public outcry following the justices' choices, whether justified
or not, has the potential to, and has, demeaned the judiciary in the eyes of the
public.22 When the public is drawn into a debate over the qualifications of the
trustees, thejudgment of those hiring them may also be questioned. The latest
19 See Moon et al., supra note 10.
" See Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 418 (describing public criticism of the appointment
process).
21 Despite the importance of selection of trustees to the success of the Estate, no particular
process to select trustees has been articulated by justices over the past 100 years. Apparently,
the last appointive round marked the first attempt to articulate a procedure. The process
apparently has not included beneficiary input. The secrecy of the process makes the justices
even more vulnerable to criticism. The cure calls for institutional reform because ad hoc
changes by the current justices to improve and open the process could easily be abandoned by
their successors.
22 The Hawai'i Supreme Court is noted for landmark rulings sparking public controversy.
Public questions concerning the justices' ability to appoint qualified trustees to this highly
visible trust may equate to the justices' general competence in the eyes of some. Thus, it seems
prudent that a court making innovative legal rulings should especially eschew controversy in
its extra-judicial activities, lest the public make misplaced generalizations about the justices.
See Robert J. Albers & Kenneth C. Fonte, Is Section 2C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Justified? An Empirical Study of the Impropriety of Judges Belonging to Exclusive Clubs, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (1995)(arguing that the public perceives judge's biases in light of
judge's affiliations); Abramson, supra note 2, at 949; Stephen Lubet, Participation by Judges
in Civic and Charitable Activities: What Are the Limits?, 69 JUDICATURE 68, 80 (1985)
[hereinafter Charitable Activities].
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publicity has battered public confidence in the justices' ability to make sound
appointments. 2' Because the Code asks judges to guard the image of the
judiciary, the mere fact that the public perceives the current appointees
negatively and questions both the propriety and competence of the justices'
role in the appointment process is reason enough for them to shun future
appointments.
CANON 4: A Judge Shall So Conduct the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities
as to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations
The fact that the justices do not act in their official capacity when
appointing the trustees is irrelevant. Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo once
wrote, "[a judge should not accept] as an individual what the judge must
reject. At least this is so when what is done is official and not personal in its
quality and incidents."' Under the Code, a judge must avoid extra-judicial
conduct which "(1) cast[s] doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as
a judge; (2) demean[s] the judicial officer; or (3) interferes with the proper
performance of judicial duties."' The court's selecting of trustees raises all
three issues. First, the justices' faithful obedience to the will raises doubts as
to whether the justices can be unbiased toward the Bishop Estate when Estate
matters come before the court. Second, the controversial nature of the
appointments, especially of politically well-connected nominees, potentially
tarnishes the perception that the judiciary in this private act or in its judicial
decision making is independent and free of political influence. Finally, the
necessity to recuse itself in matters concerning the management of the largest
private landowner in the State, the awkward role of oversight over the justices
by their own inferior probate court, and the attorney general's regulatory
oversight of their activity in the Bishop Estate all interfere with performance
of their judicial duties.
The Code's commentary reminds a judge to "regularly reexamine the
activities of each organization with which the judge is affiliated to determine
" A full 69% of the public in a September 1997 public opinion poll believe that the
justices' current trustee appointments are NOT doing a good job. Sixty four percent also feel
that the Bishop Estate "has too much power" in Hawai'i. Most telling, 48% want the justices
out of the business of appointing trustees. Thirty-two percent believe the justices should
continue to appoint the trustees and 20% are not sure. See Jim Witty, 90 Percent Back Bishop
Inquiry, HONOLULU STAR-BuUETN, Sept. 23, 1997, at A-1. While the justices must never
yield to public opinion in their judicial role, they must yield in their extra-judicial role because
they are the guardians of public confidence in the independence and integrity of the system.
24 In re Richardson, 160 N.E. 655, 662 (N.Y. 1928)(quoted in Cox, supra note 9, at 300
n.98 (1980), criticizing decisions of Hawai'i Supreme Court justices to appoint trustees).
" HAw. REv. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A (1992).
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if it is proper for the judge to continue the affiliation."'26 The Code justifies
intruding into a judge's personal activities in recognition that public
confidence in the judiciary is imperative to public cooperation, and thus
essential to a free society. "A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the
judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly."" The reason for this stricture is clear:
The need for the judiciary to avoid the appearance of partiality exists even in the
absence of actual wrongdoing or favoritism. Judges are customarily assisted
only by bailiffs; like the Pope, they have no regiments. Consequently, in a
democracy the enforcement ofjudicial decrees and orders ultimately depends on
public cooperation.' s
The regulation of a judge's extra-judicial charitable conduct serves three
broad policies related to public perception of the judiciary. First, ajudge must
avoid the appearance of partiality toward organizations finding his or her
personal favor.29  Second, the association of a judge with specific
organizations may erode public confidence in the judge's independence or
judgment) ° Third, a judge must not allow personal endeavors to distract from
his or her judicial activities.3
The general rule is that "judges must refrain from service in organizations
which are regular or likely litigants ... ."32 The Code discourages a judge
from having a key extra-judicial role in organizations precisely because of the
kind of perceptions here.3 The dual role of appointing the trustees and ruling
I Id. Canon 4C(3)(a) commentary. For example, Canon 4's commentary cautions that as
"charitable hospitals are now more frequently in court than in the past[,]" a judge should
examine the propriety of any affiliation. Md
M I Canon 2A commentary.
CharitableActivities,supra note 22, at 69-70; Stephen Lubet, JudicialEthicsandPrivate
Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 983, 986 (1985)("Should the citizenry conclude, even erroneously,
that cases were decided on the basis of favoritism or prejudice rather than according to law and
fact, then regiments would be necessary to enforce judgments.").
2 See Charitable Activities, supra note 22, at 69; see also Nielson v. Nielson, No. 03A01-
9506-CV-00186, 1996 WL 16018 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1996)(requiring recusal and
acknowledging violation of code of conduct; judge's participation on the advisory board of a
civic organization is improper, non-legal advice where the organization's membership may
occasionally be called as expert witnesses in proceedings before the court).
3' See Charitable Activities, supra note 22, at 69.
31 See id
22 Md at 80.
3 Although each justice does not serve as an "officer, director, trustee or non-legal
advisor," roles specifically prohibited on behalf of charities which might come before the court
or in a court over which the judge has appellate jurisdiction under Canon 4C(3)(a), the justices'
unique power to appoint is certainly a substantial and key role in an organization frequently
appearing before them or their inferior courts. "The provisions of this Code are to be construed
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on trust business' raises an appearance of conflict and bias. As one critic
commented, "[w]hen the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of what's okay
and what isn't with respect to trustee liability, it's most unfortunate to have
them be the ones who have picked the trustees .... 3." Certainly a litigant in
a lease-to-fee conversion suit or other lawsuit against the Bishop Estate might
have justifiable concern when learning that the supreme court selected the
trustees with whom the litigant now quarrels.
Canon 4E discourages a judge from accepting fiduciary roles generally and
especially as to parties likely to come before them.36 A fiduciary relationship
exists "wherever a trust, continuous or temporary, is specially reposed in the
skill or integrity of another.., and it may exist in the absence of a specific or
technical trust or agency."'3 It arises "in all cases where there has been a
special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound
to act in good faith, and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the
confidence... ."38
The justices enjoy an extremely important power under the will, and when
exercising their appointment power, they owe a fiduciary duty to the trust's
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries, like the Princess before them, place their
trust in the justices to exercise this power wisely. The Code generally
prohibits judges from engaging in fiduciary activities because of the dual and
conflicting roles of fiduciary and judge. By placing the interests of the
beneficiaries first, they necessarily must place the public and their judicial
role second. When the justices' appointees are ones with close ties to the
government or to the judiciary, one might logically ask whose interests their
appointments served-the state's or the Bishop Estate's?
and applied to further [the integrity and independence of the judiciary]." HAW. REV. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon IA (1992).
34 See, e.g., Murray v. Kobayashi, 50 Haw. 104,431 P.2d 940 (1967)(providing instructions
on interpreting provision in will requiring religious hiring practices); Richards v. Midkiff, 48
Haw. 32, 396 P.2d 49 (1964)(involving suit by one of several trustees against others); In re
Estate of Bishop, 37 Haw. 111 (1945)(concerning dispute between trustees and attorney general
over trustee commissions); In re Estate of Bishop, 36 Haw. 728 (1944)(involving a dispute over
accounting); In re Bishop Estate, 36 Haw. 403 (1943)(involving compensation of trustee);
Collins v. Hodgson, 36 Haw. 334 (1943)(regarding dispute over expenditures).
3S Stephen G. Greene, Misplaced Trust?, CHRON. PHIlANTHROPY, Oct. 2, 1997, at 1. The
article continues, "What's more, the attorney general's ability to oversee and regulate charities
is potentially hampered when that official must also argue cases periodically before the same
body that has appointed the trustees of a charity that he or she may wish to investigate." Id.
(quoting "Ed Halbach, a former dean at the University of California at Berkeley law school and
an expert on trust law.").
36 See HAW. REV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 4E (1992).
37 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary (1961).
39 Id.
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II. 1994 COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCr OPINION #14-93
In 1994, the Commission on Judicial Conduct issued an advisory opinion
commenting on the propriety of the justices' involvement in the appointment
of trustees.39 Ironically, the Commission commended the justices for attempt-
ing to remove political influence from the process by using a blue ribbon
committee to screen applicants. Unfortunately, history shows that the process
failed and the justices rejected the panel's work. Moreover, even were these
particularjustices able to devise a selection process free of political influence
and other conflicts, the justices have no power to ensure that the changes
would endure beyond their tenure. The controversial role of the justices in the
selection process spans decades and calls for institutional reform.
The 1994 opinion largely neglected analysis under Canon 4 governing
extra-judicial conduct; nevertheless, the Commission's cautious pronounce-
ments as to the propriety of continuing under Canons 1, 2, and 5 were hardly
an endorsement of continued involvement in appointing trustees. First, the
Commission noted that its own members were divided as they began their
deliberations-a telling comment, for it mirrors how the people of Hawai'i
view the justices' role. The Commission also cautioned the justices that they
must revisit the appropriateness of their iole if public perceptions place the
image of the judicial system at risk.' The opinion further warned:
The Commission understands that the uniqueness of Hawaii's socio-economic
and geographical features renders the question presented here in Hawaii
significantly distinguishable from those settings in other jurisdictions, which do
not have the unique cultural conditions present in our State. However, such
factors cannot and do not serve as the basis for our conclusion. Of much greater
importance to this Commission is the fact that public confidence in, respect for,
and perception of the integrity of our judicial system, greatly outweighs the
importance of the Bishop Estate trustee selection.4'
9 Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal Advisory Opinion #14-93, Apr. 7, 1994.
,o Specifically, the Commission stated:
The Commission recognizes that there is a question about whether or not public
perception in Hawai'i is that the trustee appointment process may be significantly and
improperly influenced by political factors. This Commission concludes that the allegation
that such a perception exists, to the extent it significantly and detrimentally affects the
integrity of the judicial system is not supportable, certainly not to the extent that such a
finding would require immediate disqualification or prohibition against the Justices from
further participation in the appointment of Bishop Estate trustees. On the other hand, it
is equally important to recognize and understand that public perception on this matter is
extremely difficult to measure and determine. Consequently, to give the benefit of the
doubt to the present Justices in this initial inquiry is more appropriate than it might be
upon any future consideration of this matter.
Id.
41 Id.
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The opinion then concluded that justices who choose to participate must
"avoid or eliminate" acts or activities which are likely to create a perception
that the selection process:
1) is in any way influenced by political factors or favors,
2) will influence or otherwise affect the judicial process to the extent Bishop
Estate is involved in litigation,
3) utilizes judicial resources to the detriment of the judiciary,
4) is influenced in anyway by religious or racial discrimination,
5) is lending the prestige of the court to the benefit of the Bishop Estate or its
trustees.4
Finally, the Commission predicted that if such negative effects could not be
removed from the process, then the Commission expected the matter to "be
before the Commission again."' 3
If. CONCLUSION
The current loud and public debate has overshadowed the justices' service
to our judicial system, and it is time for the justices to reevaluate their service
to the Bishop Estate. While their sense of responsibility to the terms of the
will is admirable, they must weigh these activities against the detrimental
effects their participation has upon citizen confidence in the judiciary. The
Code asks all judges to put aside their private, extra-judicial activities for the
sake of public respect for, and confidence in, our judicial system. Regardless
of their good intent, under the Code, they must acquiesce to public opinion
against their involvement in this extra-judicial activity, so that all who come
before them will have trust and confidence in the integrity of the court.
UPDATE
Since this Article was written, four of the five justices of the Hawai'i
Supreme Court announced that they would no longer participate in the
selection of the Bishop Estate Trustees." The justices cited a desire to combat
the growing distrust and cynicism toward the judiciary as their prime motive.
42 id
43 Id.
" See Rick Daysog, Selection of Trustees Explored, HONOiLUW STAR-BULIET, Dec. 22,
1997, at A-I.
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Justice Robert Klein did not concur, emphasizing the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's long history and tradition of appointing trustees. 45
Deciding how trustees should be appointed remains an unsettled and urgent
concern because "interim" trustees serve in place of the variously permanently
or temporarily ousted trustees at the present. Now that this provision in the
will has failed (at least for the time being), the probate court needs to establish
a process for the selection and appointment of trustees.
Although the four justices have bowed out of the process, the propriety of
judges appointing the trustees in their unofficial capacity remains a vital topic.
In September 1999, the Hawai'i State Attorney General ("Attorney General")
recommended to the probate court that the four sitting members of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") fill future vacancies.'
The Attorney General informed the probate court that the ICA judges were
willing to assume this responsibility.47 The Attorney General reasoned that
using the ICA judges would best approximate the process prescribed in the
Princess' Will now that a majority of the Supreme Court had elected not to
participate in appointing trustees." The Attorney General further reasoned
that employing the ICA judges rather than the supreme court justices cured
most, if not all, of the ethical and practical problems associated with judicial
involvement in the appointment process.49 The Attorney General noted that
historically the ICA did not hear Bishop Estate cases and so its recusal from
Bishop Estate matters would not interfere with the delivery ofjudicial services
to the state."
The Attorney General attributed the perception of impropriety and politics
in the appointment process to the compensation issue, explaining:
The perception of political influence will exist even if the appointment power is,
contrary to the Will, removed from members of the judiciary. So long as KSBE
trustees are overpaid in relation to their skills or experience or in relation to their
contribution to society, an appointment will be perceived as political no matter
who makes it."'
The Attorney General's view is simplistic. Bishop Estate trusteeship will
always be prized because of the Estate's great wealth, land, and status as an
important Hawaiian institution.
45 See id.
' See Attorney General's Response to Petition for the Establishment of a Procedure for
Selection of Future Trustees, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Sept. 13,
1999).
47 See id. at 11.
48 See id. at7.
49 See id. at 7-11.
50 See id. at 8, 10.
51 Id. at 9-10.
670
1999 / APPOINTING TRUSTEES
The court rejected the Attorney General's position, calling it "unpersua-
sive" and "illogical.""2 The court instead appointed a seven-member selection
committee comprised of community leaders to identify candidates for final
selection by the probate court.5 3 However, the court also noted that the
supreme court may one day resume the practice of appointing trustees if it so
chose.-'
Finally, an important question lingers. In 1993, the justices abandoned the
religious preference toward Protestants prescribed in the will because they
could not discriminate on the basis of religion, even when acting unofficially.
If an independent selection process is developed and judicial involvement is
limited to appointing the trustee selected and recommended by others, then
may the Protestant qualification within the will be honored? 5 Certainly a
court will need to visit this issue.
52 See Rick Daysog, Judge Appoints Panel to Nominate Future Trustees, HONOLULU STAR-
BULLETN, Jan. 7, 2000, at A-8.
s See id.
See i.
s See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)(holding that judicial enforcement of a
discriminatory provision in a private contract violates the Fourteenth Amendment). Whether
enforcement of discriminatory testamentary provisions constitute improper state action likely
depends on the extent of state involvement. See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y.
1983); In Re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1975); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575
A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990).

